EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER
In the context of criminal proceedings, "character" has three meanings:
(i) the accused's general reputation in the community
(ii) the accused's criminal convictions (if any)
(iii) the accused's propensity to behave in a certain way that is relevant to proving his guilt of the present offence.
The general rule is that evidence of the accused's bad character cannot be heard by the court.
The rules before CJA 2003 came into force were that the accused enjoyed a "shield", but could lose that shield in certain circumstances and lay himself open to cross-examination on previous convictions. Under CJA 2003 the bad character of an accused may be admitted through seven gateways laid down by CJA 2003. Before considering the bad character of the accused, a brief mention is required of the evidential value of the accused's good character and the position of a non-defendant.
EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED'S GOOD CHARACTER
An accused will wish to lay before. the jury evidence of his good character, if he has one, in an effort to show them that he is not the kind of person who would commit the offence with which he is charged. This is just one item of circumstantial evidence the jury may take into account, and is only marginally relevant. "Good character" will generally mean the absence of a criminal record.
The proper approach to a defendant's good character is to be found in Vye [1993] and Aziz and Others [1995], where the House of Lords considered the giving of good character directions. A defendant with no previous convictions is prima facie entitled to a good character direction both as to credibility and to propensity. The judge, however, has a residual discretion to qualify it or dispense with it if possible criminal conduct by the defendant has emerged during the trial. The judge should invite submissions on his proposed direction where he is considering giving one.
BAD CHARACTER OF NON-DEFENDANTS
Protection for non-defendants from disclosure of evidence relating to bad character is novel.
The pre-CJA 2003 position was that witnesses could always be cross-examined about previous convictions either at common law or under s6 Criminal Procedure Act 1865. Such evidence was regarded as relevant to the credibility of the witness. The admission of this evidence is now regulated by s100(I) CJA 2003, which provides three gateways for the admission of bad character evidence as defined by s98. Evidence relating to the bad character of a non-defendant will be admissible if, and only if
(a) it is important explanatory evidence;
(b) it has substantial probative value in relation to a matter which:
(i) is a matter in issue in the proceedings, and
(ii) is of substantial importance in the context of the case as a whole; or
(c) all parties to the proceedings agree to the evidence being admissible.
Leave of the court is required before evidence can be admitted under (a) or (b).
s 100(2) explains what is meant by important explanatory evidence: without it the court would find it impossible or difficult to understand other evidence in the case.
s100(3) identifies factors that must be considered in assessing whether evidence has substantial probative value under s100(1)(b):
the nature and number of events to which the evidence relates; in the case of evidence of misconduct that is said to have probative value by virtue of its similarity between that conduct and other alleged misconduct, the nature and extent of the similarities and dissimilarities between each of the alleged instances of misconduct.
Suppose a defendant were charged with murder and claims that a prosecution witness committed that murder. It is highly likely that evidence relating to previous instances of violence committed by the witness on the complainant would be admitted because that evidence would have a substantial probative value in relation to an issue in the case and would be of substantial importance in the context of the case as a whole.
BAD CHARACTER OF DEFENDANTS
Bad character evidence relating to a defendant is regulated by s101(l) CJA 2003, which provides seven gateways through which bad character evidence can be admitted:
(a) all parties agree to the evidence being admitted;
(b) the evidence is adduced by the defendant himself or is given in answer to a question asked by him in cross-examination and intended to elicit it;
(c) it is important explanatory evidence;
(d) it is relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution;
(e) it has substantial probative value in relation to an important matter in issue between the defendant and a co-defendant;
(f) it is evidence to correct a false impression given by the defendant; (g) the defendant has made an attack on another person's character.
The first two gateways under (a) and (b) are not contentious. A defendant will often volunteer evidence about bad character when he realises evidence will inevitably be admitted under one of the other gateways. By volunteering the information he can suggest he is being totally frank and honest with the court.
Important explanatory evidence (100(1)(c)) is defined in s102 in identical terms to those used in s100(2) (see 23.8.2). Evidence admissible under gateway (c) would include:
• evidence of events that occurred close in time, place or circumstance to the offence charged;
• evidence necessary to complete an account of the circumstances of the offences charged so as to make it comprehensible to a jury;
• evidence of a previous relationship between the defendant and the alleged victim of the offence charged;
• evidence to establish motive.
Important matter in issue between defendant and prosecution (s 101(1)(d)) is potentially the widest and most far-reaching gateway. The evidence, to be admissible, must have relevance either to a fact in issue or to the credibility of the defendant.
Matters in issue between defendant and prosecution include (s103(1)):
• whether the defendant has a propensity to commit offences of the kind with which he is charged, except where his having such a propensity makes it no more likely that he is guilty of the offence;
• whether the defendant has a propensity to be untruthful.
Evidence of propensity to commit offences of the kind with which he is charged may, by virtue of s103(2), be shown by proving that the defendant has been previously convicted of an offence either of the same description or the same category as the one with which he has been charged.
An offence of the same description is one that would have been written in the same terms in the charge or indictment (s 104(4)(a)), so if a defendant is charged with rape and has two previous convictions for rape, those previous convictions would normally be admissible to show he has a propensity to commit offences of the kind with which he is charged.
Categories of offence are defined by the Secretary of State (s103(4)(a)). Two categories of offence have so far been prescribed: the Theft category and the Sexual Offences (persons under the age of 16) category. The previous convictions of defendants charged with an
offence listed within either category will be disclosed to the court as evidence of propensity where the convictions are listed within the same category. Included within the Theft category are offences of theft, burglary or aggravated burglary where the intention is to steal, robbery, taking a motor vehicle without consent, aggravated vehicle taking, handling stolen goods, going equipped for stealing and making off without payment. The Sexual Offences category is equally wide, covering rape, intercourse with a girl under 16, incest, indecency, indecent assault and a whole range of other offences committed on persons under the age of 16.
Also admissible as evidence of propensity under s 101(1)(d) will be evidence of misconduct previously admitted under similar fact evidence rules. Although CJA 2003 has abolished common law rules, it is likely that much of the case law on similar fact evidence will remain relevant, hence a short explanation of the previous law is necessary.
Makin v Attorney-General for New South Wales [18941 was the first case to lay down rules for the admission of similar fact evidence. The case involved the trial for murder following the death of a baby who had been in the care of the Makins. It would seem that the couple ran an unofficial adoption service, taking on the care of children in return for payment by the parents. The prosecution was allowed to admit evidence that the bodies of 13 other babies had been found buried in the grounds of properties previously inhabited by the Makins. Lord Herschell in the Privy Council laid down the important rule that evidence of propensity or disposition to commit the sort of offence charged is insufficient unless that evidence is relevant to an issue before the jury. That rule remains of importance, in light of s103(1): evidence of propensity is admissible except where his having such a propensity makes it no more likely that he is guilty of the offence.
The second important case in terms of evolution of similar fact evidence rules was DPP v Boardman [1975]. The facts are unimportant, although the test remains of some interest. In order to be admissible under similar fact evidence rules, evidence must be (1) relevant to an issue in the case; and (2) its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect.
As a result of s 101(1)(d), propensity itself has been made a fact in issue in every case, so evidence of propensity will always be prima facie admissible. Although propensity evidence must have a probative value (it will not be admissible where the evidence makes it no more likely that the defendant is guilty of the offence charged), there is no longer a requirement for judges to weigh that probative value against its prejudicial effect.
The third important case on similar fact evidence was DPP v P [1991], which clarified the test in Boardman. The gist of that test was that similar fact evidence must have a sufficiently strong probative force to justify its admission despite its prejudicial effect. Again, there is no requirement for this balancing exercise to be performed where evidence of propensity is admitted under s 101(1)(d).
By way of example, suppose the defendant was charged with burglary and had six previous convictions for burglary. Under similar fact evidence rules, evidence relating to those previous convictions would be inadmissible because that evidence shows no more than a propensity to commit burglary. Suppose the burglary with which the defendant was charged was committed at 7 Elm Road; his six previous convictions for burglary related to offences committed sequentially at l, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 Elm Road. In those circumstances the previous convictions might be admissible as similar fact evidence because the evidence has a high degree of probative force in identifying the defendant as the offender in the present case.
Interestingly, of course, under CJA 2003 there would be no need to establish a high probative force in this scenario. Evidence of this defendant's previous convictions could be admitted as evidence of propensity, wherever the offences were committed, since they were offences of the same description and also offences within the Theft category.
s101(1), (3) provides a discretion to exclude evidence under s101(i)(d) where its admission would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. In exercising this discretion, courts must pay particular regard to the length of time between the matters to which the evidence relates and matters which form the subject of the offence charged (s 101(4)).
s 103 (1)(b) admits evidence of a propensity to be untruthful, although evidence is inadmissible under this paragraph except where there is a suggestion that the defendant has been untruthful in the present trial.
Important matter in issue between defendant and co-defendant (s 1 O l (1)(e)) allows evidence of bad character to be admitted where it has substantial probative value in relation to an important matter in issue between the defendant and a co-defendant. Insertion of the words substantial probative value make it more difficult for a co-accused to cross-examine on previous convictions than for the prosecution under s 101(1)(d). This might lead to challenges under the "equality of arms" provisions within Art 6 ECHR, or on grounds that a co-accused has been denied the right to adduce relevant evidence. This gateway will apply where two defendants run "cut-throat" defences, each suggesting the other is the guilty party. Randall [2003] provides a good illustration, although it was decided before CJA 2003 came into force. Two defendants were jointly charged with murder and ran cut-throat defences, each blaming the other for the murder. The first defendant's previous convictions were serious and included convictions for violence; the second defendant's convictions were minor. Their different convictions suggested that the first defendant was the more likely assailant. It is probable that, had s 101 been in force, the first defendant's convictions would have been admissible under s 101(1)(e) as having a substantial probative value in relation to an issue between defendant and co-defendant.
Creating a false impression (s101(1)(f): a defendant who suggests that he is honest and hard-working, yet has previous criminal convictions for dishonesty, is likely to fall foul of this gateway.
s105(l) lays down that only such evidence as has probative value in correcting the false impression will be admitted, so where a defendant suggests he is honest but has a conviction for theft, that would be disclosed to the court. If he also had a conviction for assault, that would be inadmissible.
An accused will be "responsible" for creating a false impression through his own testimony in court, through responses made to questioning at a pre-trial stage, or through the testimony of defence witnesses or through the response of a prosecution witness during cross-examination (s105(2)).
s105(2)(a) states that a false impression may be created by a defendant through his conduct in the proceedings. Clearly, a defendant who purported to be a vicar by wearing a "dog collar" would be caught by this paragraph.
Making an attack on another person's character (s101(1)(g)) allows admission of evidence of bad character where a defendant impugns the character of any other person. Under the previous law defendants could freely attack persons who were not called as witnesses by the prosecution; under s 101(1)(g) no attack can be made upon anyone, so a suggestion that a third party might have committed the offence with which the defendant is charged will open this gateway.
The attack may be made by the accused in the course of testimony, by his legal representative during cross-examination of a witness, or on being questioned under caution or charged (s 106(1)). An ill-thought out and enthusiastic denial of involvement during police interview may be sufficient to trigger this gateway.
Previous case law is likely to prove useful to judges charged with interpreting s 101(1)(g). Defendants who suggest that a witness has lied: Britzman and Hall [1983] or that a confession has been obtained improperly: Cook [1959] or that a witness has behaved reprehensibly Selvey v DPP [ 1970] will have their bad character admitted, although a suggestion that a witness is merely mistaken will not open the gateway.
Under s101(3) CJA 2003, the court's discretion to exclude evidence of bad character is restricted to gateways (d) and (g). That section adopts the wording of s78(1) PACE 1984, providing that the court must exclude evidence where its admission would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that it ought not to be admitted. This discretion is triggered by an application from the defence.
s101(4) specifically states that nothing in the Act affects the exclusion of evidence on grounds other than the fact that it is evidence of the defendant's bad character, so judges, at least theoretically, could continue to exclude evidence of bad character under s78(1) PACE 1984 under paragraphs (c), (e) and (f).
s107 CJA 2003 provides that, on trials on indictment, the judge must stop the case if satisfied that:
• evidence is "contaminated"; and
• the contamination is such that having regard to its importance the conviction would be unsafe.
Where character rulings are made by a court the judge (or magistrates) must give reasons for those rulings (s 110).
In the context of criminal proceedings, "character" has three meanings:
(i) the accused's general reputation in the community
(ii) the accused's criminal convictions (if any)
(iii) the accused's propensity to behave in a certain way that is relevant to proving his guilt of the present offence.
The general rule is that evidence of the accused's bad character cannot be heard by the court.
The rules before CJA 2003 came into force were that the accused enjoyed a "shield", but could lose that shield in certain circumstances and lay himself open to cross-examination on previous convictions. Under CJA 2003 the bad character of an accused may be admitted through seven gateways laid down by CJA 2003. Before considering the bad character of the accused, a brief mention is required of the evidential value of the accused's good character and the position of a non-defendant.
EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED'S GOOD CHARACTER
An accused will wish to lay before. the jury evidence of his good character, if he has one, in an effort to show them that he is not the kind of person who would commit the offence with which he is charged. This is just one item of circumstantial evidence the jury may take into account, and is only marginally relevant. "Good character" will generally mean the absence of a criminal record.
The proper approach to a defendant's good character is to be found in Vye [1993] and Aziz and Others [1995], where the House of Lords considered the giving of good character directions. A defendant with no previous convictions is prima facie entitled to a good character direction both as to credibility and to propensity. The judge, however, has a residual discretion to qualify it or dispense with it if possible criminal conduct by the defendant has emerged during the trial. The judge should invite submissions on his proposed direction where he is considering giving one.
BAD CHARACTER OF NON-DEFENDANTS
Protection for non-defendants from disclosure of evidence relating to bad character is novel.
The pre-CJA 2003 position was that witnesses could always be cross-examined about previous convictions either at common law or under s6 Criminal Procedure Act 1865. Such evidence was regarded as relevant to the credibility of the witness. The admission of this evidence is now regulated by s100(I) CJA 2003, which provides three gateways for the admission of bad character evidence as defined by s98. Evidence relating to the bad character of a non-defendant will be admissible if, and only if
(a) it is important explanatory evidence;
(b) it has substantial probative value in relation to a matter which:
(i) is a matter in issue in the proceedings, and
(ii) is of substantial importance in the context of the case as a whole; or
(c) all parties to the proceedings agree to the evidence being admissible.
Leave of the court is required before evidence can be admitted under (a) or (b).
s 100(2) explains what is meant by important explanatory evidence: without it the court would find it impossible or difficult to understand other evidence in the case.
s100(3) identifies factors that must be considered in assessing whether evidence has substantial probative value under s100(1)(b):
the nature and number of events to which the evidence relates; in the case of evidence of misconduct that is said to have probative value by virtue of its similarity between that conduct and other alleged misconduct, the nature and extent of the similarities and dissimilarities between each of the alleged instances of misconduct.
Suppose a defendant were charged with murder and claims that a prosecution witness committed that murder. It is highly likely that evidence relating to previous instances of violence committed by the witness on the complainant would be admitted because that evidence would have a substantial probative value in relation to an issue in the case and would be of substantial importance in the context of the case as a whole.
BAD CHARACTER OF DEFENDANTS
Bad character evidence relating to a defendant is regulated by s101(l) CJA 2003, which provides seven gateways through which bad character evidence can be admitted:
(a) all parties agree to the evidence being admitted;
(b) the evidence is adduced by the defendant himself or is given in answer to a question asked by him in cross-examination and intended to elicit it;
(c) it is important explanatory evidence;
(d) it is relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution;
(e) it has substantial probative value in relation to an important matter in issue between the defendant and a co-defendant;
(f) it is evidence to correct a false impression given by the defendant; (g) the defendant has made an attack on another person's character.
The first two gateways under (a) and (b) are not contentious. A defendant will often volunteer evidence about bad character when he realises evidence will inevitably be admitted under one of the other gateways. By volunteering the information he can suggest he is being totally frank and honest with the court.
Important explanatory evidence (100(1)(c)) is defined in s102 in identical terms to those used in s100(2) (see 23.8.2). Evidence admissible under gateway (c) would include:
• evidence of events that occurred close in time, place or circumstance to the offence charged;
• evidence necessary to complete an account of the circumstances of the offences charged so as to make it comprehensible to a jury;
• evidence of a previous relationship between the defendant and the alleged victim of the offence charged;
• evidence to establish motive.
Important matter in issue between defendant and prosecution (s 101(1)(d)) is potentially the widest and most far-reaching gateway. The evidence, to be admissible, must have relevance either to a fact in issue or to the credibility of the defendant.
Matters in issue between defendant and prosecution include (s103(1)):
• whether the defendant has a propensity to commit offences of the kind with which he is charged, except where his having such a propensity makes it no more likely that he is guilty of the offence;
• whether the defendant has a propensity to be untruthful.
Evidence of propensity to commit offences of the kind with which he is charged may, by virtue of s103(2), be shown by proving that the defendant has been previously convicted of an offence either of the same description or the same category as the one with which he has been charged.
An offence of the same description is one that would have been written in the same terms in the charge or indictment (s 104(4)(a)), so if a defendant is charged with rape and has two previous convictions for rape, those previous convictions would normally be admissible to show he has a propensity to commit offences of the kind with which he is charged.
Categories of offence are defined by the Secretary of State (s103(4)(a)). Two categories of offence have so far been prescribed: the Theft category and the Sexual Offences (persons under the age of 16) category. The previous convictions of defendants charged with an
offence listed within either category will be disclosed to the court as evidence of propensity where the convictions are listed within the same category. Included within the Theft category are offences of theft, burglary or aggravated burglary where the intention is to steal, robbery, taking a motor vehicle without consent, aggravated vehicle taking, handling stolen goods, going equipped for stealing and making off without payment. The Sexual Offences category is equally wide, covering rape, intercourse with a girl under 16, incest, indecency, indecent assault and a whole range of other offences committed on persons under the age of 16.
Also admissible as evidence of propensity under s 101(1)(d) will be evidence of misconduct previously admitted under similar fact evidence rules. Although CJA 2003 has abolished common law rules, it is likely that much of the case law on similar fact evidence will remain relevant, hence a short explanation of the previous law is necessary.
Makin v Attorney-General for New South Wales [18941 was the first case to lay down rules for the admission of similar fact evidence. The case involved the trial for murder following the death of a baby who had been in the care of the Makins. It would seem that the couple ran an unofficial adoption service, taking on the care of children in return for payment by the parents. The prosecution was allowed to admit evidence that the bodies of 13 other babies had been found buried in the grounds of properties previously inhabited by the Makins. Lord Herschell in the Privy Council laid down the important rule that evidence of propensity or disposition to commit the sort of offence charged is insufficient unless that evidence is relevant to an issue before the jury. That rule remains of importance, in light of s103(1): evidence of propensity is admissible except where his having such a propensity makes it no more likely that he is guilty of the offence.
The second important case in terms of evolution of similar fact evidence rules was DPP v Boardman [1975]. The facts are unimportant, although the test remains of some interest. In order to be admissible under similar fact evidence rules, evidence must be (1) relevant to an issue in the case; and (2) its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect.
As a result of s 101(1)(d), propensity itself has been made a fact in issue in every case, so evidence of propensity will always be prima facie admissible. Although propensity evidence must have a probative value (it will not be admissible where the evidence makes it no more likely that the defendant is guilty of the offence charged), there is no longer a requirement for judges to weigh that probative value against its prejudicial effect.
The third important case on similar fact evidence was DPP v P [1991], which clarified the test in Boardman. The gist of that test was that similar fact evidence must have a sufficiently strong probative force to justify its admission despite its prejudicial effect. Again, there is no requirement for this balancing exercise to be performed where evidence of propensity is admitted under s 101(1)(d).
By way of example, suppose the defendant was charged with burglary and had six previous convictions for burglary. Under similar fact evidence rules, evidence relating to those previous convictions would be inadmissible because that evidence shows no more than a propensity to commit burglary. Suppose the burglary with which the defendant was charged was committed at 7 Elm Road; his six previous convictions for burglary related to offences committed sequentially at l, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 Elm Road. In those circumstances the previous convictions might be admissible as similar fact evidence because the evidence has a high degree of probative force in identifying the defendant as the offender in the present case.
Interestingly, of course, under CJA 2003 there would be no need to establish a high probative force in this scenario. Evidence of this defendant's previous convictions could be admitted as evidence of propensity, wherever the offences were committed, since they were offences of the same description and also offences within the Theft category.
s101(1), (3) provides a discretion to exclude evidence under s101(i)(d) where its admission would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. In exercising this discretion, courts must pay particular regard to the length of time between the matters to which the evidence relates and matters which form the subject of the offence charged (s 101(4)).
s 103 (1)(b) admits evidence of a propensity to be untruthful, although evidence is inadmissible under this paragraph except where there is a suggestion that the defendant has been untruthful in the present trial.
Important matter in issue between defendant and co-defendant (s 1 O l (1)(e)) allows evidence of bad character to be admitted where it has substantial probative value in relation to an important matter in issue between the defendant and a co-defendant. Insertion of the words substantial probative value make it more difficult for a co-accused to cross-examine on previous convictions than for the prosecution under s 101(1)(d). This might lead to challenges under the "equality of arms" provisions within Art 6 ECHR, or on grounds that a co-accused has been denied the right to adduce relevant evidence. This gateway will apply where two defendants run "cut-throat" defences, each suggesting the other is the guilty party. Randall [2003] provides a good illustration, although it was decided before CJA 2003 came into force. Two defendants were jointly charged with murder and ran cut-throat defences, each blaming the other for the murder. The first defendant's previous convictions were serious and included convictions for violence; the second defendant's convictions were minor. Their different convictions suggested that the first defendant was the more likely assailant. It is probable that, had s 101 been in force, the first defendant's convictions would have been admissible under s 101(1)(e) as having a substantial probative value in relation to an issue between defendant and co-defendant.
Creating a false impression (s101(1)(f): a defendant who suggests that he is honest and hard-working, yet has previous criminal convictions for dishonesty, is likely to fall foul of this gateway.
s105(l) lays down that only such evidence as has probative value in correcting the false impression will be admitted, so where a defendant suggests he is honest but has a conviction for theft, that would be disclosed to the court. If he also had a conviction for assault, that would be inadmissible.
An accused will be "responsible" for creating a false impression through his own testimony in court, through responses made to questioning at a pre-trial stage, or through the testimony of defence witnesses or through the response of a prosecution witness during cross-examination (s105(2)).
s105(2)(a) states that a false impression may be created by a defendant through his conduct in the proceedings. Clearly, a defendant who purported to be a vicar by wearing a "dog collar" would be caught by this paragraph.
Making an attack on another person's character (s101(1)(g)) allows admission of evidence of bad character where a defendant impugns the character of any other person. Under the previous law defendants could freely attack persons who were not called as witnesses by the prosecution; under s 101(1)(g) no attack can be made upon anyone, so a suggestion that a third party might have committed the offence with which the defendant is charged will open this gateway.
The attack may be made by the accused in the course of testimony, by his legal representative during cross-examination of a witness, or on being questioned under caution or charged (s 106(1)). An ill-thought out and enthusiastic denial of involvement during police interview may be sufficient to trigger this gateway.
Previous case law is likely to prove useful to judges charged with interpreting s 101(1)(g). Defendants who suggest that a witness has lied: Britzman and Hall [1983] or that a confession has been obtained improperly: Cook [1959] or that a witness has behaved reprehensibly Selvey v DPP [ 1970] will have their bad character admitted, although a suggestion that a witness is merely mistaken will not open the gateway.
Under s101(3) CJA 2003, the court's discretion to exclude evidence of bad character is restricted to gateways (d) and (g). That section adopts the wording of s78(1) PACE 1984, providing that the court must exclude evidence where its admission would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that it ought not to be admitted. This discretion is triggered by an application from the defence.
s101(4) specifically states that nothing in the Act affects the exclusion of evidence on grounds other than the fact that it is evidence of the defendant's bad character, so judges, at least theoretically, could continue to exclude evidence of bad character under s78(1) PACE 1984 under paragraphs (c), (e) and (f).
s107 CJA 2003 provides that, on trials on indictment, the judge must stop the case if satisfied that:
• evidence is "contaminated"; and
• the contamination is such that having regard to its importance the conviction would be unsafe.
Where character rulings are made by a court the judge (or magistrates) must give reasons for those rulings (s 110).
Labels: Thursday 8 March 2007
posted by John Robotham at 5:02 AM
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